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Abstract. Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice,
there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the
theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This
paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external
social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional ratio-
nalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of
rational choice on general domains a` la Richter (1966; 1971) and Hansson (1968).
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1 Introduction
In his Presidential Address to the Econometric Society, Sen (1993) argued against a`
priori imposition of requirements of internal consistency of choice such as the weak and
the strong axioms of revealed preference, Arrow’s (1959) axiom of choice consistency, and
Sen’s (1971) condition α, and investigated the implications of eschewing these internal
choice consistency requirements.
The gist of his criticism can be neatly summarized in terms of his own example that
goes as follows. Let C be the choice function that specifies, for any admissible non-empty
set S of feasible alternatives, a non-empty subset C(S) of S, which is to be called the
choice set of S. Then Sen (1993, p.500) poses the following question: “[C]an a set of
choices really be seen as consistent or inconsistent on purely internal grounds without
bringing in something external to choice, such as the underlying objectives or values that
are pursued or acknowledged by choice?” To bring his point into clear relief, Sen invites
us to examine the following two choices:
C({x, y}) = {x} and C({x, y, z}) = {y}.
As Sen rightly points out, this pair of choices violates most of the standard choice consis-
tency conditions including the weak and the strong axioms of revealed preference, Arrow’s
axiom of choice consistency, and Sen’s condition α. It is arguable and indeed Sen (1993,
p.501) argues that this seeming inconsistency can be easily resolved if only we know more
about the person’s choice situation: “Suppose the person faces a choice at a dinner table
between having the last remaining apple in the fruit basket (y) and having nothing instead
(x), forgoing the nice-looking apple. She decides to behave decently and picks nothing
(x), rather than the one apple (y). If, instead, the basket had contained two apples, and
she had encountered the choice between having nothing (x), having one nice apple (y)
and having another nice one (z), she could reasonably enough choose one (y), without
violating any rule of good behavior. The presence of another apple (z) makes one of the
two apples decently choosable, but this combination of choices would violate the standard
consistency conditions . . . even though there is nothing particularly ‘inconsistent’ in this
pair of choices . . . .”
On the face of it, Sen’s argument to this effect may seem to go squarely against the
theory of rationalizability a` la Arrow (1959), Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), Sen
(1971), Suzumura (1976a) and many others, where the weak axiom of revealed preference
is a necessary condition for rationalizability.1 The purpose of this paper is to develop a new
1Recollect that the standard theory of rationalizability has an important point of bifurcation depending
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concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and build a bridge between rationalizability
theory and Sen’s criticism. In essence, what emerges from our theory is the peaceful
co-existence of a norm-conditional rationalizability theory and Sen’s elaborated criticism
against internal consistency of choice.
More precisely, we introduce a model of choice where external norms are taken into
consideration by specifying all pairs consisting of a feasible set and an element of this set
with the interpretation that this element is prohibited from being chosen from this set
by the relevant system of social norms. Norm-conditional rationalizability then requires
the existence of a preference relation such that, for each feasible set in the domain of
the choice function, the chosen elements are at least as good as all elements in the set
except for those that are prohibited by the social norm. This approach is very general
because no restrictions are imposed on how the system of social norms comes about—any
specification of a set of pairs as described above is possible. The traditional model of
rational choice is included as a special case—the case that obtains if the set of prohibited
pairs is empty. It is important to emphasize that, unlike earlier approaches that attempt
to incorporate external social norms into models of choice, our framework does not rely
on implicit assumptions such as, for example, everyone in a society having the same
preferences and a decision-maker should refrain from choosing the unique best element
according to such a common preference relation; see, for instance, Baigent and Gaertner
(1996). We will return to this issue in the concluding section of this paper.
Apart from this introduction, the paper consists of four sections. Section 2 is devoted
to the preliminary analysis of preference relations and their extensions to (complete)
orderings. Section 3 introduces the concept of external norms and relates them to the
concept of a choice function. Section 4 defines the crucial concept of norm-conditional
rationalizability and shows how the standard theory of rationalizability can be modified
on the specification of choice domains. The classical theory of revealed preference due originally to
Samuelson (1938; 1947; 1948; 1950) and Houthakker (1950) was concerned with the choice functions on
the domains of competitive budgets, whereas the expansion of the choice functional theory beyond the
narrow confinement of competitive consumers due to Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) had a constraint of its
own, and presupposed that the domains were confined to the finite sets of alternatives. See, also, Aizerman
and Aleskerov (1995), and Schwartz (1976) for further work along this line. It was Richter (1966; 1971),
Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1976a; 1977; 1983) who explored the general rationalizability theory
without these domain constraints, thereby making the theory universally applicable to whatever choice
contexts we may want to specify. Recent years have witnessed further development of the general theory
of rationalizability in the tradition of Richter and Hansson without any external norm. See Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura (2005; 2006) and Kim and Richter (1986), among others.
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in such a way that the core essence of rationalizability theory can be kept intact in the
presence of external norms. Section 5 concludes with remarks on some related literature.
2 Preference Relations
Let X be a universal non-empty set of alternatives and let R ⊆ X × X be a (binary)
relation on X. The asymmetric factor P (R) of R is given by (x, y) ∈ P (R) if and only if
(x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) 6∈ R for all x, y ∈ X, and the symmetric factor I(R) of R is defined
by (x, y) ∈ I(R) if and only if (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R for all x, y ∈ X.
The transitive closure tc(R) of a relation R is defined by letting, for all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ tc(R) ⇔ ∃K ∈ N, ∃x0, . . . , xK ∈ X :
x = x0 & (xk−1, xk) ∈ R ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} & xK = y.
For any binary relation R, tc(R) is the smallest transitive superset of R.
A relation R ⊆ X ×X is reflexive if, for all x ∈ X,
(x, x) ∈ R
and R is complete if, for all x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y,
(x, y) ∈ R ∨ (y, x) ∈ R.
R is transitive if, for all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ R & (y, z) ∈ R] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ R.
It is clear that R is transitive if and only if R = tc(R). A quasi-ordering is a reflexive and
transitive relation and an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering.
R is consistent if, for all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ tc(R) ⇒ (y, x) 6∈ P (R).
This notion of consistency is due to Suzumura (1976b) and it is equivalent to the require-
ment that any cycle must be such that all relations involved in this cycle are instances of
indifference—strict preference cannot occur. To facilitate the understanding of this con-
cept, we may define the consistent closure cc(R) of R as the smallest consistent superset
of R. This is the concept coined by Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005), which may
be written explicitly as follows. For all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ cc(R) ⇔ (x, y) ∈ R ∨ [(x, y) ∈ tc(R) & (y, x) ∈ R].
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Clearly, for any binary relation R, we have R ⊆ cc(R) ⊆ tc(R) and R is consistent if
and only if R = cc(R). It is easy to verify that consistency implies (but is not implied
by) the well-known acyclicity axiom which rules out the existence of strict preference
cycles (cycles composed entirely of instances of strict preference). Consistency and quasi-
transitivity, which requires that P (R) is transitive, are independent. Transitivity implies
consistency but the reverse implication is not true in general. However, if R is reflexive
and complete, consistency and transitivity are equivalent.
A relation R∗ is an extension of R if and only if R ⊆ R∗ and P (R) ⊆ P (R∗). If an
extension R∗ of R is an ordering, we refer to R∗ as an ordering extension of R. One of
the most fundamental results on extensions of binary relations is due to Szpilrajn (1930)
who showed that any transitive and asymmetric relation has a transitive, asymmetric and
complete extension. The result remains true if asymmetry is replaced with reflexivity,
that is, any quasi-ordering has an ordering extension. Arrow (1951, p.64) stated this
generalization of Szpilrajn’s theorem without a proof and Hansson (1968) provided a
proof on the basis of Szpilrajn’s original theorem. While the property of being a quasi-
ordering is sufficient for the existence of an ordering extension of a relation, this is not
necessary. As shown by Suzumura (1976b), consistency is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of an ordering extension; see Suzumura (1976b, pp.389–390).
3 Norms and Choices
A choice situation is described by a feasible set S of alternatives, where S is a non-
empty subset of X. Social norms such as those discussed in the introduction can be
expressed by identifying feasible sets and alternatives that are not to be chosen from
these feasible sets. For example, suppose there is a feasible set S = {x, y}, where x stands
for selecting nothing and y stands for selecting (a single) apple. Now consider the feasible
set T = {x, y, z} where there are two (identical) apples y and z available. The social
norm not to take the last apple can easily and intuitively be expressed by requiring that
the choice of y from S is excluded, whereas the choice of y (or z) from T is perfectly
acceptable. In general, norms of that nature can be expressed by identifying all pairs
(S, w), where w ∈ S, such that w is not supposed to be chosen from the feasible set S.
To that end, we use a set N , to be interpreted as the set of all pairs (S, w) of a feasible
set S and an element w of S such that the choice of w from S is prevented by the social
norm under consideration.
More formally, suppose X is the power set of X excluding the empty set. A choice
4
function is a mapping C: Σ→ X such that C(S) ⊆ S \{z ∈ S | (S, z) ∈ N} for all S ∈ Σ,
where Σ ⊆ X with Σ 6= ∅ is the domain of C. Let C(Σ) denote the image of Σ under
C, that is, C(Σ) = ∪S∈ΣC(S). As is customary, we assume that C(S) is non-empty for
all sets S in the domain of C. Thus, using Richter’s (1971) term, the choice function
C is assumed to be decisive. To ensure that this requirement does not conflict with the
restrictions imposed by the norm N , we require N to be such that, for all S ∈ Σ, there
exists x ∈ S satisfying (S, x) 6∈ N . The set of all possible norms satisfying this restriction
is denoted by N.
This model of norm-conditional choice may appear somewhat restrictive at first sight
because it specifies pairs of a feasible set and single objects not to be chosen from that set.
One might want to consider the following seeming generalization of this approach: instead
of only including pairs of the form (S, x) with x ∈ S when defining a system of norms,
one could include pairs such as (S, S ′) with S ′ ⊆ S, thus postulating that the subset S ′
should not be chosen from S. Contrary to first appearance, this does not really provide
a more general model of norm-conditional rationalizability because, in order to formulate
our notion of norm-conditional rationality, we require that a chosen element x ∈ C(S) has
to be at least as good as all feasible elements except those that are already excluded by the
social norm according to a norm-conditional rationalization—that is, x has to be at least
as good as all y ∈ S except for those y ∈ S such that (S, y) ∈ N . Allowing for pairs (S, S ′)
does not provide a more general notion of norm-conditional rationalizability because the
subset of S, the elements of which have to be dominated by a chosen object, can be
obtained in any arbitrary way from the subsets S ′ such that S ′ cannot be selected from
S according to the social norm. For simplicity of exposition, we work with the simpler
version of our model introduced above but note that this formulation does not involve any
loss of generality when it comes to the definition of norm-conditional rationality employed
in this paper.
Returning to Sen’s example involving the norm “do not choose the last available
apple,” we can, for instance, define the universal set X = {x, y, z}, the domain Σ =
{S, T} ( X with S = {x, y} and T = {x, y, z}, and the social norm described by the
set N = {(S, y)}. Thus, the social norm requires that y 6∈ C(S) but no restrictions
are imposed on the choice C(T ) from the set T—that is, this social norm represents the
requirement that the last available apple should not be chosen.
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4 Norm-Conditional Rationalizability
The notion of rationality explored in this paper is conditional on a system of social norms
N ∈ N as introduced in the previous section. In contrast with the classical model of
rational choice, an element x that is chosen by a choice function C from a feasible set
S ∈ Σ need not be considered at least as good as all elements of S by a rationalizing
relation, but merely at least as good as all elements y ∈ S such that (S, y) 6∈ N . That
is, if the choice of y from S is already prohibited by the norm, there is no need that x
dominates such an element y according to the rationalization. Needless to say, the chosen
element x itself must be admissible in the presence of the prevailing system of social
norms.
To make this concept of norm-conditional rationalizability precise, let a system of
social norms N ∈ N and a feasible set S ∈ Σ be given. An N -admissible set for (N , S),
AN (S) ⊆ S, is defined by letting, for all x ∈ S,
x ∈ AN (S) ⇔ (S, x) 6∈ N .
Note that, by assumption, AN (S) 6= ∅ for all N ∈ N and for all S ∈ Σ.
We say that a choice function C on Σ is N -rationalizable if and only if there exists a
binary relation RN ⊆ X ×X such that, for all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ S,
x ∈ C(S) ⇔ x ∈ AN (S) & [∀y ∈ AN (S) : (x, y) ∈ RN ].
In this case, we say that RNN -rationalizes C, or RN is an N -rationalization of C.
To facilitate our analysis of N -rationalizability, a generalization of the notion of the
direct revealed preference relation RC ⊆ X ×X of a choice function C is of use. For all
x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ RC ⇔ ∃S ∈ Σ : x ∈ C(S) & y ∈ AN (S).
The (indirect) revealed preference relation of C is the transitive closure tc(RC) of the
direct revealed preference relation RC .
We consider three basic versions of norm-conditional rationalizability. The first is N -
rationalizability by itself, where an N -rationalization RN does not have to possess any
additional property (such as reflexivity, completeness, consistency or transitivity). This
notion of rationalizability is equivalent toN -rationalizability by a reflexive relation (this is
also true for the standard definition of rationalizability without social norms; see Richter
(1971)). The second is N -rationalizability by a consistent relation (again, reflexivity can
be added and an equivalent condition is obtained; see Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
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(2005)). Finally, we consider N -rationalizability by a transitive relation which, again as
in the classical case, turns out to be equivalent to N -rationalizability by an ordering; see
Richter (1966; 1971).
We first provide three preliminary results. The following lemma states that the direct
revealed preference relation RC must be respected by any N -rationalization RN . This
observation parallels that of Samuelson (1948; 1950) in the traditional framework; see also
Richter (1971).
Lemma 1 Let N ∈ N be a system of social norms and let C be a choice function. If RN
is an N -rationalization of C, then RC ⊆ RN .
Proof. Suppose that RN is an N -rationalization of C and x, y ∈ X are such that
(x, y) ∈ RC . By definition of RC , there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ AN (S).
Because RN is an N -rationalization of C, we obtain (x, y) ∈ RN . Thus, RC ⊆ RN must
be true.
Analogously, any consistent N -rationalization RN must respect not only the direct
revealed preference relation RC but also its consistent closure cc(RC).
Lemma 2 Let N ∈ N be a system of social norms and let C be a choice function. If RN
is a consistent N -rationalization of C, then cc(RC) ⊆ RN .
Proof. Suppose that RN is a consistent N -rationalization of C and x, y ∈ X are such that
(x, y) ∈ cc(RC). By definition of the consistent closure of a binary relation, (x, y) ∈ RC
or [(x, y) ∈ tc(RC) and (y, x) ∈ RC ] must hold. If (x, y) ∈ RC , (x, y) ∈ RN follows from
Lemma 1. If [(x, y) ∈ tc(RC) and (y, x) ∈ RC ], there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X
such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. By Lemma
1, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RN for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, thus, (x, y) ∈ tc(RN ). Furthermore,
(y, x) ∈ RC implies (y, x) ∈ RN by Lemma 1 again. If (x, y) 6∈ RN , it follows that
(y, x) ∈ P (RN ) in view of (y, x) ∈ RN . Because (x, y) ∈ tc(RN ), this contradicts the
consistency of RN . Therefore, (x, y) ∈ RN . Thus, cc(RC) ⊆ RN must be true.
Finally, if transitivity is required as a property of an N -rationalization RN , this rela-
tion must respect the transitive closure tc(RC) of RC .
Lemma 3 Let N ∈ N be a system of socal norms and let C be a choice function. If RN
is a transitive N -rationalization of C, then tc(RC) ⊆ RN .
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Proof. Suppose that RN is a transitive N -rationalization of C and x, y ∈ X are such
that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC). By definition of the transitive closure of a binary relation RC , there
exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
and xK = y. By Lemma 1, we obtain x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RN for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
and xK = y. Repeated application of the transitivity of RN implies (x, y) ∈ RN . Thus
tc(RC) ⊆ RN must hold.
We are now ready to identify a necessary and sufficient condition for each one of these
notions of N -rationalizability of a choice function. To obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for simple N -rationalizability (that is, N -rationalizability by a binary relation
RN that does not have to possess any further property), we follow Richter (1971) by
generalizing the relevant axiom in his approach in order to accommodate an externally
imposed system of norms N . This leads us to the following axiom.
N -conditional direct-revelation coherence: For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ AN (S),
[∀y ∈ AN (S) : (x, y) ∈ RC ] ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
Our first result establishes that this property is indeed necessary and sufficient for N -
rationalizability.
Theorem 1 Let N ∈ N be a system of social norms and let C be a choice function. C
is N -rationalizable if and only if C satisfies N -conditional direct-revelation coherence.
Proof. “Only if.” Suppose RN is an N -rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ AN (S)
be such that (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ AN (S). By Lemma 1, (x, y) ∈ RN for all y ∈ AN (S),
which implies x ∈ C(S) because RN is an N -rationalization of C.
“If.” Suppose C satisfies N -conditional direct-revelation coherence. We complete the
proof by showing that RN = RC is an N -rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ AN (S).
Suppose first that x ∈ C(S). By definition, it follows immediately that (x, y) ∈ RC =
RN for all y ∈ AN (S).
Conversely, suppose that (x, y) ∈ RC = RN for all y ∈ AN (S). It follows that
N -conditional direct-revelation coherence immediately implies x ∈ C(S). Thus, C is
N -rationalizable by RN = RC .
As is the case for the traditional model of rational choice on general domains, it is
straightforward to verify that N -rationalizability by a reflexive relation is equivalent to
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N -rationalizability without any further properties of an N -rationalization; this can be
verified analogously to Richter (1971). However, adding completeness as a requirement
leads to a stronger notion of N -rationalizability; see again Richer (1971).
Next, we examine N -rationalizability by a consistent relation, which is equivalent
to N -rationalizability by a reflexive and consistent relation. As in the traditional case,
adding completeness, however, leads to a stronger property, namely, one that is equivalent
to N -rationalizability by an ordering; see Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005) for an
analogous observation in the traditional model.
The requisite necessary and sufficient condition is obtained from N -conditional direct-
revelation coherence by replacing RC with its consistent closure cc(RC).
N -conditional consistent-closure coherence: For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ AN (S),
[∀y ∈ AN (S) : (x, y) ∈ cc(RC)] ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 2 Let N ∈ N be a system of social norms and let C be a choice function.
C is N -rationalizable by a consistent relation if and only if C satisfies N -conditional
consistent-closure coherence.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. All that needs to be done is
replace RC with cc(RC) and invoke Lemma 2 instead of Lemma 1.
Our final result establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for N -rationalizability
by a transitive relation which is equivalent to N -rationalizability by an ordering. We leave
it to the reader to verify that the proof strategy employed by Richter (1966; 1971) in the
traditional case generalizes in a straightforward manner to the norm-dependent model
when establishing that transitive N -rationalizability is equivalent to N -rationalizability
by an ordering.
The requisite necessary and sufficient condition is obtained from N -conditional direct-
revelation coherence by replacing RC with its transitive closure tc(RC).
N -conditional transitive-closure coherence: For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ AN (S),
[∀y ∈ AN (S) : (x, y) ∈ tc(RC)] ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
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Theorem 3 Let N ∈ N be a system of social norms and let C be a choice function.
C is N -rationalizable by a transitive relation if and only if C satisfies N -conditional
transitive-closure coherence.
Proof. Again, the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. All that needs to be done
is replace RC with tc(RC) and invoke Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 1.
5 Conclusion
Instead of summarizing the main contents of this short paper, let us conclude with two
remarks on the literature with some relevance to the present paper.
(1) Shortly after the publication of Sen’s criticism against internal consistency of
choice, Baigent and Gaertner (1996) presented an axiomatic characterization of what can
be called the never-choose-the-uniquely-largest choice function. This choice function was
motivated by an alternative interpretation of Sen’s example cited in the Introduction,
which is due to Sen himself. Although the characterized choice function is not without
interest, the characterizing axioms are too complex to be easily intuitively interpretable.
Besides, there is no discussion in Baigent and Gaertner on the compatibility between
external social norms and the general theory of rationalizability.
(2) It was Sen (1997) who made an important step towards the norm-conditional theory
of rationalizability through the concept of self-imposed choice constraints, excluding the
choice of some alternatives from permissible conducts. According to Sen’s (1997, p.769)
scenario, “the person may first restrict the choice options . . . by taking a ‘permissible’
subset K(S), reflecting self-imposed constraints, and then seek the maximal elements
M(K(S), R) in K(S).”2 Despite an apparent family resemblance between Sen’s concept
of self-imposed choice constraints and our concept of norm-conditionality, Sen did not go
as far as to bridge the idea of norm-induced constraints and the theory of rationalizability
as we did in this paper.
It is hoped that the present paper provides the missing link in the existing literature
and shows that external social norms can be internalized by means of a suitably modified
revealed preference theory.
2For any S ⊆ X and R ⊆ X × X, M(S,R) is the set of R-maximal points in S, that is to say,
M(S,R) = {x∗ ∈ S | ∀x ∈ S : (x, x∗) /∈ P (R)}.
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